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Abstract Social capital can serve as informal governance in
weak investor-protection regimes. Using hand-collected data
on entrepreneurs’ political connections and firm ownership,
we construct several original measures of social capital and
examine their effect on the performance of entrepreneurial
firms in China after their initial public offerings. Political
connections or a high percentage of external investors tend to
enhance firm performance, but intragroup related-party
transactions commonly lead to performance decline. These
forms of social capital have a strong influence on the perfor-
mance of Chinese firms, whereas formal governance variables
such as board size or board independence have little effect.
Although social capital may serve as an informal governance
mechanism and effectively substitute for formal governance
mechanisms in an emerging market, this role of social capital
raises several ethical concerns, notably the development of
rent-seeking and crony capitalism.
Keywords Post-IPO performance  Social capital 
Agency theory  Entrepreneur  Political connection  China
Introduction
This study investigates the role of informal governance mech-
anisms for entrepreneurial firms in the Chinese stock market.
We address important questions raised in the initial public
offering (IPO) literature (Ritter and Welch 2002): what drives
post-IPO performance, and can such performance be predicted
in a weak investor-protection regime? Using hand-collected
data from China’s unique regulatory context, we construct
several informal governance measures for a firm’s social cap-
ital, with reference to the theory of social capital (Adler and
Kwon 2002; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). We examine the
effect of such informal governance, i.e., social capital, on post-
IPO firm performance and compare it with formal governance
variables. Our research attempts to shed more light on the role
of these important factors in entrepreneurial firm performance.
The finance literature establishes that there is generally
deterioration in the performance of entrepreneurial firms
after their IPOs. Such declines are largely caused by two
problems related to corporate governance: (1) consumption
of private benefits, and (2) window-dressing of the
accounts. For example, Jain and Kini (1994) show that
ownership retention by the pre-IPO shareholders is posi-
tively related to post-IPO accounting performance. How-
ever, Mikkelson et al. (1997) investigate ownership-related
proxies such as shareholding concentration, existence of
blockholders, and secondary sales, and find that these
factors seldom explain the decline in post-IPO accounting
performance. Most of the empirical evidence on these
factors is derived from studies of IPOs in the US market.
This evidence, however, may not reflect the situation in
emerging markets, where the pure agency issue1 is not
highly relevant, and ownership is often concentrated. The
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1 In contrast to the agency problem known to exist when ownership is
diffused, the main conflict in China is between controlling and
minority shareholders, because the controlling shareholders have
highly concentrated ownership (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Accord-
ing to Bae et al. (2012), controlling shareholders’ expropriation of
minority shareholder investments is the key channel through which
corporate governance affects firm value.
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current lack of understanding on the important questions of
post-IPO performance and investor protection in emerging
institutional environments warrants more research.
Although most existing studies examine the role of
formal measures for governing institutions (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Acemoglu
2003; La Porta et al. 1999; Djankov et al. 2002), it is
becoming important to understand the effects of informal
corporate governance on firm performance (Aguilera et al.
2008). The common wisdom is that social networks or ties
like guanxi often play significant roles in emerging markets
such as Asia.2 We therefore study the role of informal
institutions in China and explore the relative influence of
informal and formal governance measures.
Our research is the first to investigate how the entre-
preneur’s social capital serves as informal governance in
emerging markets. We borrow the social capital theory
from sociology to form novel measures of informal gov-
ernance mechanisms. Adler and Kwon (2002) define social
capital as a mechanism to capture the collective actions and
resultant outcomes associated with interaction between
groups. In their pioneering work, Nahapiet and Ghoshal
(1998) propose that social capital is ‘‘the sum of the actual
and potential resources embedded within, available
through, and derived from the network of relationships
possessed by an individual or social unit’’ (p. 243). Adler
and Kwon (2002) present two distinct views of social
capital, the first reflecting an actor’s relations with other
external actors, and the second related to the structure of
relations between actors in a collectivity: ‘‘A focus on
external relations foregrounds what has been called
‘bridging’ forms of social capital, whereas a focus on
internal ties within collectivities foregrounds ‘bonding’
forms of social capital’’ (p. 19).
In accordance with Adler and Kwon (2002), we propose
to consider political connections and external investors as
measures of bridging social capital. Both these measures of
social capital capture a firm’s external relationships with
outside stakeholders. They are highly relevant measures for
emerging markets such as China, for two reasons. First, in
emerging economies, an entrepreneur’s capability to create
an effective political network is a key success factor (Ire-
land et al. 2008; Le and Nguyen 2009; Morck and Yeung
2004). Second, the prevalence of large blockholders in
emerging markets means that the type II agency problem
(conflict between large shareholders and minority inves-
tors) eclipses the traditional type I agency problem
(between owners and managers) (La Porta et al. 1999;
Villalonga and Amit 2006). The way an entrepreneur/
controller deals with external shareholders before and after
an IPO thus becomes a key component of bridging social
capital in the context of emerging markets.
Bonding social capital can be proxied by intragroup and
related-party transactions, because entrepreneurial firms
are often controlled by business groups. It is common in
Eastern Asia (including China) for a business group (often
a conglomerate) to list part of its business, but keep other
parts of its operations away from the public market’s
scrutiny.3 Related-party transactions within business
groups define the internal boundaries of intragroup firms
which function as a business group.
Using hand-collected data on entrepreneurs’ political
connections and firm ownership, we construct several ori-
ginal measures of social capital and examine their effect on
the performance of entrepreneurial firms in China after
their IPOs. Political connections or a high percentage of
external investors tend to enhance firm performance, but
intragroup related-party transactions commonly lead to
performance decline. We include formal governance vari-
ables such as board independence or size, and find that they
do not affect IPO firm performance.
By linking the entrepreneurs’ social capital attributes to
their firms’ post-IPO performances, this study makes sev-
eral contributions to the literature. First, the performance of
firms’ IPOs has been an important issue in China, because
many IPOs are perceived by retail investors as ‘‘safe’’
investments. Governance issues in the newly listed firms
have typically been ignored by small public investors, who
invest heavily and actively in the Chinese IPO market.
Private enterprises find capital raising through IPOs as a
critical means of access to equity financing. Therefore, our
evaluation of IPO performance is sorely needed.
Our research also contributes to the literature in the
sense that we propose to study an informal governance
mechanism based on social capital variables. We show that
formal governance measures such as board independence
have very little influence on firm performance, while
informal governance measures play important roles. This
study therefore brings fresh empirical evidence to enrich
the recent debates on business ethics and the links between
guanxi, firm performance (Zhang and Zhang 2006), and
Chinese private entrepreneurs’ participation in politics
(Tian et al. 2008). We construct new measures of bridging
and bonding social capital that distinguish between exter-
nal and internal relationships. These new measures enable
2 Peng and Heath (1996) find that it is informal constraints rather
than formal institutions that play the more important role in regulating
emerging markets. Peng (2002) emphasizes the importance of
interactions between formal and informal constraints for organiza-
tions in emerging markets such as Asia.
3 Khanna and Palepu (2000) explain that when institutions intended
to enhance the efficiency of input and output markets are underde-
veloped, family firms and business groups can act as substitutes for
the inefficient external capital and labor markets.
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us to understand the different governance roles related to
disciplining and entrenchment effects.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. The
second section describes the institutional background to
entrepreneurial IPOs in China. The third section summa-
rizes the theory of social capital, and develops hypotheses
on the relationships between bridging and bonding social
capital as they relate to the post-IPO performance of listed
entrepreneurial firms. The fourth section presents the
sample, the data sources, and the construction of variables.
The fifth section discusses the results of our empirical
analysis and their ethical implications. Conclusions are
drawn in the sixth section, which also presents theoretical
and practical implications, the limitations of the study, and
directions for future research.
Institutional Background to Entrepreneurial Firm IPOs
in China
The stock market has gained considerable momentum in
China since the early 1990s. Chinese shares were valued at
21.15 trillion yuan (US$2.79 trillion) on August 9, 2007,
exceeding the nation’s previous-year GDP for the first
time.4 At the end of October 2011, a total of 2,304 com-
panies were listed on China’s two stock exchanges in
Shanghai and Shenzhen, with total market capitalization of
US$24.30 trillion yuan (US$3.86 trillion). As stated by the
Chinese government, the main purposes for launching the
stock market 20 years ago were to raise the much-needed
capital for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and to facilitate
SOEs’ restructuring as ‘‘modern corporations’’ (the process
called gongsihua in Chinese). Equity market financing in
China thus shows a tremendous bias in favor of SOEs over
non-SOEs. However, the number of privately owned firms
listed on the Chinese stock market has still increased
substantially: this is both a reflection and a consequence of
general private-sector development.
China’s first privately owned listed firm appeared in
1992, but during the 1992–1997 period, the number of such
firms was negligible compared to the rapid increase in
market capitalization and the total number of listed firms.
In 1997, fewer than 6 % of listed firms were privately
owned, despite the private sector’s growing importance in
the Chinese economy. In 1998, the market witnessed the
start of a boom in privately owned listed firms. As of 2007,
491 (34 %) of the 1,453 publicly listed firms were private;
some were privatized former SOEs, and some were newly
founded directly in the private sector. The sample used in
this study only includes firms from the second group
(entrepreneurial firms). As private ownership in China has
been given a new lease of life in recent history, with all
private companies built from scratch only since the eco-
nomic reform of 1978, the founders of these firms are still
actively involved in their management, and have de facto
control of the companies.
Consistent with the public sector’s important role in
China’s economic reform, the government is heavily
involved in stock market regulation. Due to certain unique
features of the Chinese stock market’s regulatory setting,
our sample provides a good research laboratory to study
IPOs.
The first of these unique features is that due to the IPO
approval system in China, it is very difficult for a firm to
obtain the listing status. Every proposed IPO must be
approved by the CSRC’s Public Offering Examination
Committee, and this is a lengthy process. The firm must
first go through a so-called ‘‘restructuring period,’’ when it
is restructured into a limited stock corporation. This period
lasts a minimum of 1 year for a firm that was already a
corporation, and can last up to 3 years for other firms. Then
comes a one-year ‘‘tutorship’’ period, during which the firm
adopts modern corporate governance structures. After these
two stages, the firm is examined by the CSRC’s Public
Offering Examination Committee, which mainly looks at
its ownership structure, its large shareholders, the quality
of its accounting information and its growth prospects. This
process lasts for 6 months. If approval is given, the stock
exchange (either Shanghai or Shenzhen) then works with
the firm to arrange the IPO. It therefore takes a firm an
average of 3 years to prepare for an IPO, and in the longer
duration cases, four and a half years or more.5 Furthermore,
the process can be interrupted and prolonged by macro-
economic policy considerations. As SOEs often benefit
from preferential ‘‘fast-track’’ listing, they are excluded
from our sample, which consists entirely of purely private
entrepreneurial firms.
A second feature of China’s regulatory system is that
Chinese IPOs cannot involve secondary share sales (in
which existing shareholders sell their shares). Only new
shares can be issued to the public. The lock-in period when
the largest shareholders are prohibited from selling their
shares is the longest in the world at 3 years. This unique
regulation means that controlling shareholders do not
actually sell their equity ownership at the time of the IPO.
For each firm included in our study, we clearly identify the
controlling shareholder, who is the entrepreneur/founder of
the firm. The top management team is often the founder
him/herself, plus family members or delegates close to the
family. Therefore, throughout the whole 6-year study
4 ‘Mainland stocks become world giants after defying global rout’,
South China Morning Post, August 15, 2007, p. B20.
5 As the Chinese stock market was not doing well during the period
2002–2006, the whole process took four or even 5 years for some
firms in our sample.
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period around each IPO (3 years before and 3 years after
the IPO), the entrepreneur/founder/controlling shareholders
are the forces behind all of the major decisions made by the
newly listed entrepreneurial firms. Information on this
control structure is found in the firms’ disclosed filing
statements.
Our sample only includes entrepreneurial firms that have
gone through IPOs. As these firms, unlike their state-owned
counterparts, have full autonomy to make their IPO deci-
sions, their decisions are not driven by political consider-
ations. Therefore, entrepreneurial firms’ motivations for
undertaking IPOs are largely consistent with those docu-
mented in US studies. The extant literature shows that the
two most prominent reasons for IPOs are (1) raising funds
to further grow the firm and (2) creating a public market for
entrepreneurs (and other shareholders) to cash in their
shares.6 However, Chinese regulatory restrictions, such as
the prohibition of secondary sales during the IPO and the
ensuing three-year lock-in period, make immediate cashing
in during or just after an IPO impossible for the entrepre-
neur. Therefore, if the main motivation for an IPO is to
create a public market so the entrepreneur can cash in his
investment in the future, a rational entrepreneur should
only make the minimum required capital share available to
external investors—just enough to achieve listed status.
Opening the share ownership wider would signal the
entrepreneur’s interest in developing a better and stronger
relationship with external investors (or ‘‘bridging’’).
Literature Review and Hypotheses
To explain the influence of social capital on the post-IPO
performance of listed entrepreneurial firms in China, this
study investigates two types of social capital: bridging
social capital and bonding social capital. These categories
are derived from social capital theory.
Social Capital Theory
Social capital is created through social relations that can be
mobilized to facilitate the attainment of needed resources,
influence, or sponsorship (Adler and Kwon 2002). Social
capital is embedded in relationships that facilitate collab-
oration and cooperation to achieve mutual benefits. Net-
work relationships involve feelings of gratitude,
reciprocity, respect, or friendship (Carolis et al. 2009).
Other researchers (Dess and Shaw 2001) point out that a
firm’s social capital can be difficult to quantify, as social
capital reflects not only a complex set of dynamic rela-
tionships within a group, but also the unique circumstances
and interactions between that group and its external
environment.
Adler and Kwon (2002) state that social capital is a form
of capital because it has the following six features: 1. It is a
long-lived asset, into which other resources can be invested
with the expectation of a future flow of benefits. 2. It is
both appropriable and convertible. 3. It can either be a
substitute for or can complement other resources. 4. It
needs maintenance. 5. Some forms of social capital are
collective goods, in the sense that they are not the private
property of those who benefit from them. 6. Investments in
the development of social capital do not seem amenable to
quantified measurement.
Being embedded in a social network promotes mutual
knowledge and recognition (Bourdieu 1985). The benefits
derived from a firm’s social capital can take the form of
both tangible and intangible assets, such as funding and
financial information (Jonsson and Lindbergh 2011). Social
network members are sources of information and oppor-
tunity. In certain circumstances, social capital may be used
to build a firm’s social status or reputation. Social capital
has been found to be important in providing legitimacy
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002),
mitigating the liabilities of being a new organization
(Stinchcombe 1965), enabling firm growth (Zimmerman
and Zeitz 2002), and preventing failure (Miner et al. 1990;
Westhead 1995). Social capital links the entrepreneur with
opportunities crucial to a firm’s success (Bull and Willard
1993; Ellis 2000), provides a firm with support, credibility,
and contacts (Ostgaard and Birley 1996), and can facilitate
innovation while reducing risks (Lipparini and Sobrero
1994).
As institutions tend to constrain possible opportunities
within acceptable boundaries, they often determine the way
entrepreneurs can legitimately explore and exploit social
capital (Clemens and Cook 1999). The social capital that
entrepreneurs possess is influenced by context and, in
particular, by institutional arrangements (Spence et al.
2003). North (1990) analyzes institutional arrangements by
distinguishing between formal and informal institutions.
The term ‘‘formal institutions’’ refers to the institutional-
ized rules, regulations, laws, and supporting apparatuses
that establish order in economic, legal, and political
frameworks. ‘‘Informal institutions’’ include the norms,
beliefs, values, and conventions that form the sociocultural
relations in a society. In transitional economies, as Ireland
et al. (2008) explain, ‘‘while formal institutional policies
and structures supporting capitalism have steadily
emerged, informal institutions remain divided between old
and new economic systems. By deterring widespread
adoption of entrepreneurial behavior, informal institutions
persisting from the socialist system undermined the tran-
sition of formal institutions during the 1990s, which were
6 For details, see the literature review by Ritter and Welch (2002,
p. 1796) and the CFO survey by Brau and Fawcett (2006).
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intended to promote entrepreneurship. Furthermore, eco-
nomic turmoil, lack of social justice, growing inequality,
and deteriorating welfare services have created dissatis-
faction with the emerging capitalist economic system’’ (p.
108). Therefore, social capital (which is one aspect of
informal institutions) becomes even more crucial for
entrepreneurs operating in such economies.
In their study of Vietnamese entrepreneurial firms, Le
and Nguyen (2009) state that ‘‘networking is crucial for
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly
in emerging economies as they seek to access resources for
development’’ (p. 867). They argue that in the absence of
effective market institutions, networks play an important
role in spreading knowledge about a firm’s existence and
practices. Networks also help a firm to learn appropriate
behavior, and therefore obtain necessary support from key
stakeholders and the general public. As a result, personal
relationships and networks are often seen as effective
substitutes for well-established institutions (Ahlstrom and
Bruton 2006; Xin and Pearce 1996). The extant literature
suggests that networking between entrepreneurs, bankers,
government officials, or friends and relatives may increase
a firm’s legitimacy and play an important support role for
both lending institutions and corporate borrowers (Ahl-
strom and Bruton 2006; Le et al. 2006; Peng 2001; Peng
and Luo 2000). For corporate borrowers, networks can act
as a vehicle for gaining access to resources, information
and support from other parties (Hoang and Antoncic 2003).
Bridging Social Capital and Firm Performance
Adler and Kwon (2002) distinguish between bridging and
bonding social capital: ‘‘The bridging view focuses pri-
marily on social capital as a resource that inheres in the
social network tying a focal actor to other actors. On this
view, social capital can help explain the differential suc-
cess of individuals and firms in their competitive rivalry:
the actions of individuals and groups can be greatly facil-
itated by their direct and indirect links to other actors in
social networks’’ (p. 19).
Carolis et al. (2009) point out that ‘‘the bridging form of
social capital is most prominent in the entrepreneurship
literature given its relevance to the formation of new
ventures’’ (p. 529). Burt (1992) suggests that social capital
creates advantages in ‘‘… the way in which social structure
renders competition imperfect by creating entrepreneurial
opportunities for certain players and not for others’’ (p. 57).
Studies in both entrepreneurship (Aldrich and Zimmer
1986; Birley 1985; Uzzi 1996; Walker et al. 1997) and
social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002; Burt 1992; Nahapiet
and Ghoshal 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998) have stressed
the importance of connections and networks in the estab-
lishment and success of new ventures.
There are two direct benefits of the bridging form of
social capital: information and influence. Social capital can
facilitate access to information, which is a critical com-
ponent of entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane and Venk-
ataraman 2000). Social capital accelerates the timing,
relevance and quality of information (Adler and Kwon
2002; Burt 1992). For example, Carolis et al. (2009) state
that ‘‘individuals with close ties to universities, perhaps
through alumni associations, may develop relationships
with researchers and thus have access to information about
emerging technologies that can be commercialized. These
individuals then have early access to promising technolo-
gies before this becomes public knowledge’’ (p. 530).
Another benefit of social capital is influence. Individuals
may accumulate favors owed by others in their network,
and then call in those favors at a later date.
Several previous studies find that bridging social capital
helps people or firms to improve their performance in
general (Burt 2004; Maurer and Ebers 2006; Shaw et al.
2005). Aarstad et al. (2010) note that ‘‘the concept explains
resources that are leveraged through collaborations with
external agents’’ (p. 1003). Burt (1992) describes social
capital as a key ingredient for success: ‘‘[it is] the structure
of the player’s network and the location of the player’s
contacts in the social structure of the arena [that] pro-
vides… [an] advantage’’ (p. 8).
In the context of transitional economies, the forms of
bridging social capital that are linked to the political sphere
attract particular interest from researchers. In their work on
Central and Eastern Europe, Ireland et al. (2008) empha-
size the importance of studying the influence of politico-
economic systems on entrepreneurs’ behavior. These
authors argue that interactions between political and eco-
nomic systems remain especially salient in emerging and
transitional economies: ‘‘Understanding the economy is not
possible without taking into account the political system
and the ease with which changes may occur in it’’ (p. 109).
These authors further comment that ‘‘the attitudes of
political actors toward entrepreneurship have significant
implications for how value (in all forms) is produced,
distributed, and exchanged throughout a society’’ (p. 110).
The predominantly political dimension of entrepreneurs’
social capital in this context may be explained by certain
features common to all emerging countries, and by other
features unique to transitional economies.
One feature found in most emerging countries (as
mentioned earlier) is weak formal institutions. Recent
studies argue that substitutive informal institutions exist in
environments where either formal institutions are not rou-
tinely enforced, or state structures are weak and lack
authority (Helmke and Levitsky 2003; North 1990). In
post-Soviet Russia, for instance, managers rely on exten-
sive networks of connections and relationships governed by
A Study of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms 533
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informal norms of reciprocity to find their way around
formal procedures. Such connections are useful for
arranging favorable borrowing terms, postponing pay-
ments, jumping queues, speeding up bank operations, or
settling business disputes (Tonoyan et al. 2010). These
networks also help private firms to protect against the lack
of ownership rights and contract laws, or the arbitrary
enforcement of business regulations (Ahlstrom and Bruton
2006). In this kind of system, actors draw disproportion-
ately on ‘‘closed business networks’’ of friends, relations,
and bureaucrats to compensate for the shortage of formal
institutions. This reliance on networks magnifies the
returns on political rent-seeking by network brokering
elites, and the system is conducive to corruption, as it
provides a suitable environment for agreeing and honoring
corrupt deals (Fischer and Reuber 2007; Morck and Yeung
2004).
In former and current socialist countries, the state still
plays a large role in distributing scarce resources. Com-
pared with SOEs, privately owned SMEs receive little
support from the government, and they typically lack
market legitimacy. In such countries, the market mecha-
nism often coexists with (and is influenced by) a govern-
ment-led redistributive mechanism, which suggests that
government officials still have a strong influence on busi-
ness practices (Boisot and Child 1996; Li and Zhang 2007;
Nguyen et al. 2006). The political dimension has a greater
influence on entrepreneurs’ actions in a country like China,
where as Tian et al. (2008) explain, ‘‘the government still
controls many scarce resources, such as access to capital,
the authority to examine and approve projects, government
purchasing, the authority to examine and to approve the
qualification of firms listing in the stock market, the
authority to use the land, …’’ (p. 631). Furthermore, since
politicians are rewarded for capital market development in
China, politicians tend to give helping hands to both state-
owned and privately owned firms in their jurisdictions with
which they have connections (for instance, by accelerating
their IPO process), in order to improve their political cre-
dentials (Piotroski and Zhang 2014).
Managers’ ties with government officials—the official
networks—represent a special type of managerial resource
in these countries (Chung 2006; Li and Zhang 2007;
Nguyen et al. 2006; Peng and Luo 2000). These networks
help private firms to navigate through cumbersome pro-
cedures with state agencies, gain access to scarce resour-
ces, and enter closely regulated industries, thereby
improving their business performance (Chung 2006; Peng
2001; Peng and Luo 2000; Xin and Pearce 1996). For
example, Tu et al. (2013) document that politically con-
nected acquirers receive preferential treatment and acquire
higher quality firms when SOEs in China become fully
privatized.
The power of official networks is evidenced in various
emerging economies (Peng 2001) such as China (Li and
Zhang 2007; Peng and Luo 2000; Xin and Pearce 1996),
Vietnam (Le and Nguyen 2009), and Eastern European
countries (Smallbone and Welter 2001). Story (2012) even
states that ‘‘cultivating relations with officials is not just a
fact of life for doing business in the mainland (China)—it
can mean the difference between success or failure.’’
Considering all these factors, we arrive at our first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Post-IPO performance improves with the
listed entrepreneurial firm’s bridging social capital, spe-
cifically the political connections of the founder and his/her
team.
Another important feature of emerging markets is the
prevalence of large blockholders in listed companies,
which is a very different situation from that described by
Berle and Means (1932). As a result, conflicts between
large internal shareholders and small external shareholders
become the predominant corporate governance issue in
emerging markets. Studies concerning both Asian listed
companies (Claessens et al. 2002) and European listed
companies (Faccio and Lang 2002) find that the market
tends to discount the stock prices of companies that have
more severe conflicts of interests between insiders and
outsiders. Some controlling shareholders, who are aware
that the relationships and interactions between controlling
internal shareholders and smaller external shareholders are
of crucial importance to the firm’s long-run performance,
make various attempts to mitigate the small external
shareholders’ concerns by voluntarily submitting them-
selves to scrutiny by external shareholders. These con-
trolling shareholders may, for example, promote the role of
the shareholders’ meeting and the board (Wan and Ong
2005), increase the board’s independence (Rosenstein and
Wyatt 1990), improve information disclosure (Eng and
Mak 2003), enhance the quality of auditing (Becker et al.
1998), or pay out more dividends (Chen et al. 2005; Faccio
et al. 2001). All of these measures can eventually enhance
the firm’s value. However, external shareholders are also
becoming more active in exerting influence on firms, not
only by monitoring but also by advising and providing
business connections. Krishnan et al. (2011) find that high-
reputation venture capitalists, acting as external share-
holders, provide not only monetary contributions, but also
non-monetary contributions such as monitoring and busi-
ness advice. These external shareholders can thus improve
the post-IPO performance of their portfolio companies. The
checks and balances, advice, and other resources provided
by external shareholders can thus be viewed as benefits
received by internal controlling shareholders through the
bridging social capital that they build up with external
534 J. X. Cao et al.
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investors. However, the entrepreneur/controller’s attitudes
toward external investors vary considerably from one firm
to another. Although some firms are open and willing to
share power with outsiders, others still prefer tight control
and low transparency. As explained in the first section,
given the regulatory restriction on secondary sale of
existing shares and the three-year lock-in period for foun-
ders, cashing in is not an option for the founder at the time
of the IPO. Therefore, more shares floated to the public
during the IPO can be considered as an indication that the
entrepreneur/controller is open to external shareholders and
willing to dilute his/her position, with the possible result of
more intensive monitoring by outsiders. All these factors
lead to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Post-IPO performance improves with the
listed entrepreneurial firm’s external investor bridging
social capital, as measured by the percentage of shares
floated during the IPO.
Bonding Social Capital and Firm Performance
Contrary to the bridging view of social capital that sees
resources as located in the firms’ external connections, the
bonding view focuses on the organization’s own actors and
their internal group characteristics. In this view, the social
capital of a collectivity (organization, community, or
nation) lies not so much in that collectivity’s external ties
to outside actors as in its internal structure—or the linkages
between individuals and groups within the collectivity.
More specifically, social capital lies in those features of a
collectivity, which give it cohesiveness, and thereby
facilitate the pursuit of collective goals (Adler and Kwon
2002). Dense connections between the parties within a
group or collective enhance self-enforcing values and
behavior, allowing the group to function and achieve
common goals (Carolis et al. 2009).
In the context of emerging economies, accumulating
bonding social capital can create great value for the
entrepreneur. As seen earlier, most emerging countries
have poorly developed formal institutions (North 1990).
This state of affairs limits not only the effectiveness of
regulation and enforcement, but also the availability of
external finance and labor resources. When institutional
efficiency is low, there will be more ‘‘relational contract-
ing,’’ i.e., relationship-based transactions or personalized
exchanges. Arm’s-length transactions are more prevalent in
a high-efficiency institutional context (Peng 2003). Con-
sistent with the above theories, Khanna and Palepu (2000)
find that diversified business groups in India generally
outperform their peers due to the existence of an intragroup
‘‘internal market,’’ which can act as a substitute for
underdeveloped external capital and labor markets. In such
cases of intragroup dealing, the entrepreneur/controlling
shareholder’s bonding social capital is beneficial for the
post-IPO performance of IPO firms.
However, there is an alternative, dark side to this
‘‘internal market.’’ Many entrepreneurs pursue overall
value maximization for the whole business group, some-
times at the expense of external investors who hold shares
in the business group’s listed entity (Chang 2003). When
this happens, the accumulation of bonding social capital
through intensive intragroup connections can have a neg-
ative effect on a listed entity’s post-IPO performance.
Related-party transactions have been widely used as a
measure of intragroup connections, and some researchers
find that such transactions are one of the main channels
through which controlling shareholders attempt to prop up
listed companies (Friedman et al. 2003), or to tunnel them
(Johnson et al. 2000). Even when the group aims to prop up
rather than tunnel one of its entities, the greater number of
related-party transactions hampers the listed entity’s inde-
pendence and causes a soft-budget constraint issue, which
makes the companies unaccountable and inefficient (Kor-
nai 1979; Stiglitz 1994).
In this study, we use the intensity of an entrepreneurial
listed firm’s transactions with the related parties of its
business group as a proxy for intragroup bonding social
capital. Although the existing theories presented earlier in
this study do not provide any grounds for a directional link
between bonding social capital and the post-IPO firm
performance, we expect to find that bonding social capital
has some (positive or negative) influence on post-IPO firm
performance. Our third hypothesis is thus as follows:
Hypothesis 3 Post-IPO performance is influenced by the
listed entrepreneurial firm’s bonding social capital, as




Our sample includes all entrepreneurial firms that con-
ducted IPOs from the initial establishment of the Chinese
stock market in 1996 until 2007. 2007 is chosen as the cut-
off year to allow for the inclusion of 3 years of post-IPO
data until 2010. Privately owned entrepreneurial compa-
nies, unlike their state-owned counterparts, have full
autonomy in making their IPO decisions, which are driven
by economic rather than political considerations.
In China, there are two ways for private companies to
become listed on the stock market: either by an IPO, or by
a ‘‘backdoor’’ listing (for example, through a reverse
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takeover). Our sample does not include such backdoor-
listed firms, as information on their pre-listing performance
is not available. The final sample consists of 181 entre-
preneurial firm IPOs. The time distribution of these IPOs is
shown in Table 1. The data needed for our analysis are
either hand-collected from the companies’ prospectuses
and annual reports, or collected from Wind Data Company
and CSMAR Data Company, which are the two leading
business data providers in China. Details of the data
sources are reported in Appendix.
Description of Variables
Return on assets (ROA) is used as the main measure of
accounting performance, and return on equity (ROE) is
used as a robustness check. ROA is a popular measure of
profitability and efficiency in asset utilization, and ROE
measures the return for shareholders. However, ROA and
ROE have a downward bias for the period immediately
after an IPO, as the proceeds raised increase the assets
immediately, but there is a time lag before the proceeds are
invested and the output of those investments translates into
net income. We control for this bias by adding IPO pro-
ceeds as a percentage of pre-IPO equity in a regression
analysis. The pre-IPO (post-IPO) accounting performance
is measured by the average ROA and ROE for the three
consecutive years before (after) the IPO year, and the
change in accounting performance is the difference
between the average ROA and ROE before and after the
IPO. For market performance, we use the post-IPO three-
year abnormal stock return, which is the firm’s stock return
during the period of 36 months starting from the first
trading day after the IPO, net of market returns during the
same period.
As presented in the hypothesis development section, we
use three proxies to capture the entrepreneur’s social
capital:
(1) Political connections of the entrepreneur and the top
management.7 This is a dummy variable that equals
one if the entrepreneur or a management team
member has political connections (defined as having
past working experience in government or in SOEs,
being a member of the National People’s Congress
or National Political Consultative Conference, or a
Chairman of a National Industry Association).8 This
variable is the proxy for the entrepreneur’s political
bridging social capital. As noted by Zhang and
Zhang (2006), ‘‘guanxi is essentially a special asset
owned by an individual and, as such, it does not
benefit the firm until the individual joins in the firm
and would like to contribute it to the firm’’ (p. 389).
We believe that the social capital possessed by the
entrepreneur and the top management should be
beneficial to the firm.
(2) Percentage of new shares floated as a measure of
existing shareholders’ ownership retention. As sec-
ondary sales are not allowed in a Chinese IPO and
only new shares can be issued to the public, the
percentage of new shares floated directly indicates
the ownership retention by existing shareholders,
and their willingness to share power with incoming
external investors. This variable is the proxy for the
entrepreneur’s external investor bridging social
capital.
(3) The intensity of intragroup transactions, measured
by the ratio of total related-party transactions in the
three post-IPO years over total sales in the three
post-IPO years. This variable is the proxy for the
entrepreneur’s intragroup bonding social capital.
When we run the regression analysis, we also control for
corporate governance characteristics and financial vari-
ables that are likely to influence firm performance. As
board composition is of great importance to entrepreneurial













1996 4 2.17 83.50 171.52
1997 16 8.08 187.00 158.64
1998 6 6.06 278.00 229.62
1999 10 10.64 374.00 136.90
2000 22 16.30 446.00 155.44
2001 9 11.39 398.00 176.58
2002 10 14.71 342.00 90.94
2003 15 22.39 333.00 57.01
2004 36 36.00 265.00 68.12
2005 7 50.00 247.00 22.55
2006 29 43.94 279.00 97.65
2007 17 13.49 332.00 213.83
This table reports the number of sample firm IPOs, number of IPOs as
a percentage of the total, average amount of proceeds raised, and
average first-day return for each year during the sample period
(1996–2007). IPO first-day return is the difference between IPO first-
day closing price and IPO offering price divided by offering price
7 In Chinese entrepreneurial companies, most founders are actively
involved in the management of their firms. Of the 82 sample
companies that have political bridging social capital, there are only
five in which the founding entrepreneurs do not occupy any
management position. Even for these five firms, it could be argued
that the firms still reflect the entrepreneur’s efforts to build political
bridging social capital by engaging managers with such social capital.
8 Tian et al. (2008) present a comprehensive study on how Chinese
private entrepreneurs participate in politics.
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firms’ post-IPO performance (Kroll et al. 2007, Walters
et al. 2010), the governance variables are mainly board-
related. The governance variables and control variables
include the following:
(1) Whether the chairman of the board is also the CEO
(dummy);
(2) Board size (natural log of the number of board
directors);
(3) Board independence (ratio of the number of
independent directors over the total number of
board directors);
(4) IPO proceeds as a percentage of pre-IPO equity;
(5) Total assets (in natural log form);
(6) Total market capitalization (in natural log form);
(7) IPO first-day return for the firm;
(8) IPO first-day return for the market;
(9) Firm/year dummies9; and
(10) Industry dummies.




Table 2 and Fig. 1 summarize the change in accounting
performance and market performance before and after the
IPO year. The mean and median differences in ROA before
and after the IPO are -6.13 and -5.40 %, respectively,
and this change is statistically significant in terms of both
the t test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The ROE
shows an even more significant post-IPO decline relative to
its pre-IPO level.
One possible explanation for the post-IPO decline in
accounting performance is that investment of the IPO
proceeds may not give quick payoffs. Therefore, we also
look at two other measures: change in sales as a percentage
of the pre-IPO level, and change in the asset turnover (the
ratio of sales over total assets). The mean and median
changes in sales are 213.28 and 147.23 %, respectively,
which indicates that more than half of the sample firms
doubled their sales after their IPO. The asset turnover rates
drop significantly after the IPO, indicating that asset utili-
zation declined even though sales increased significantly.
Altogether, the summary statistics show that the overall
accounting performance deteriorates after an IPO despite
strong sales growth, which is consistent with the findings in
the extant literature (Jain and Kini 1994; Mikkelson et al.
1997). However, without running the multivariate regres-
sion while controlling for other contributing factors, the
possibility that post-IPO investment has not yet translated
into increased sales cannot be ruled out.
Regarding market performance, the mean and median
three-year abnormal stock returns are 22.0 and -14.1 %,
respectively, which indicates that more than half of the
sample firms were outperformed by the market during their
three-year post-IPO period. However, the huge difference
between mean and median suggests the existence of out-
liers. We therefore conduct a 1 % winsorization (two-
sided) on abnormal stock returns, and regression analysis is
then run on the winsorized variable.
Panel B, Table 2 reports the social capital characteristics
of the sample firms. In total, 82 firms have built up political
bridging social capital. Of these firms, 58 began this
political bridging before their IPO, and 32 began after the
IPO.10 On average, the sample firms issue 30 % of new
shares to external investors. Regarding the intragroup
bonding social capital, the related-party transactions rep-
resent an average of 0.64 % of the sales value.
Panel C of Table 2 shows the sample firms’ corporate
governance and financial characteristics. For 23.76 % of
the sample firms, the chairman of the board is also the
CEO. The average number of directors on the board is 9.12,
and 22.2 % of directors are independent.
Before the regression analysis, we first conduct univar-
iate tests to investigate the relationship between social
capital and accounting or market performance. The results
are reported in Table 3. The sample is broken down based
on (1) political bridging social capital, (2) external investor
bridging social capital, and (3) intragroup bonding social
capital. Univariate tests show that political bridging social
capital has a strong bearing on accounting and market
performance after an IPO, but the effects of the external
investor bridging social capital and the intragroup bonding
social capital are less substantial.
Post-IPO Accounting Performance and the Firm’s
Social Capital
We now relate the change in accounting performance to the
firms’ social capital proxies by an OLS regression analysis.
The specific model tested is:
9 The application of year fixed effects is very necessary, since our
sample period includes the Split Share Structure Reform period in
China between 2005 and 2006, which terminated trading constraints
on restricted shares in China and also threatened the price premium on
their freely traded counterparts. The literature documents that this
reform brought about profound changes in the power balance between
large and small shareholders, as well as in large shareholders’
incentives vis-a`-vis the firm’s accounting and market performances
(Hou and Lee 2013; Cumming and Hou 2014).
10 Of these 32 firms, eight had political bridging social capital prior
to their IPO.
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Table 2 Summary statistics
Stats Mean Median T test Wilcoxon rank-sum test
Panel A: Change in accounting and market performance
Change in sales as percentage of pre-IPO sales 213.28 % 147.23 % 10.26*** 11.51***
Change in asset turnover -0.32 -0.29 -7.79*** -10.12***
Change in ROA -6.13 % -5.40 % -15.40*** -11.17***
Change in ROE -5.74 % -2.78 % -20.34*** -11.53***
Post-IPO three-year abnormal stock return 22.0 % -14.1 % – –
Mean Median SD
Panel B: Social capital variables
Political bridging social capital (dummy variable) 0.27 0.00 0.45
Pre-IPO political bridging social capital (dummy variable) 0.33 0.00 0.47
Post-IPO political bridging social capital (dummy variable) 0.18 0.00 0.38
External investor bridging social capital (percentage of new shares issued) 30.21 % 28.00 % 6.37 %
Intragroup bonding social capital (related-party transactions) 0.64 0.37 0.88
Panel C: Corporate governance and financial characteristics
If CEO is chairman 23.76 % 0.00 % 42.68 %
Number of board directors 9.12 9.00 2.41
Number of independent directors as percentage of total 22.20 % 33.33 % 17.45 %
Proceeds raised as percentage of pre-IPO equity 258.51 % 225.21 % 157.11 %
Ln (total asset) 19.44 19.38 0.67
Ln (market value) 20.99 20.96 0.57
Panel A reports the sample means, median, t test statistics, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test of whether sample mean and median are equal to zero for
post-IPO change between accounting performance and post-IPO three-year abnormal stock return. Change in sales as a percentage of pre-IPO
sales is the difference between a sample firm’s three-year average sales after the IPO and the three-year average sales before the IPO as
percentage of three-year average sales before the IPO. Change in asset turnover is the difference between a sample firm’s three-year average asset
turnover after the IPO and the three-year average asset turnover before the IPO. Asset turnover is the ratio of a firm’s sales revenues over total
assets. Change in ROA (ROE) is the difference between a sample firm’s three-year average ROA (ROE) after the IPO and the three-year average
ROA (ROE) before the IPO. ROA (ROE) is the ratio of net income over total assets (equity). Post-IPO three-year stock abnormal return is a
sample firm’s stock return during the period of 3 years starting from the next trading day after the IPO, net of the market return. Market return is
the arithmetic mean of return for all stocks outstanding on the market during the same period. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1 %
(***), 5 % (**), and 10 % (*) level, respectively
Panels B and C report the sample means, medians, and standard deviations of social capital variables, and corporate governance, and financial
characteristics, respectively. Political bridging social capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the entrepreneur or a management team
member has political connections, which is defined as having past working experience in government or SOEs, being a member of the National
People’s Congress or National Political Consultative Conference, or being a Chairman of a National Industry Association. Pre-IPO Political
bridging social capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has developed political connections before the IPO. Post-IPO political
bridging social capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has no political connections before the IPO, and has developed political
connections only after the IPO. External investor bridging social capital is the percentage of new shares floated to the public in the IPO.
Intragroup bonding social capital is the ratio of total related-party transactions in the three post-IPO years over total sales in the three post-IPO
years
‘‘CEO is chairman’’ is a dummy variable that equals one if the chairman of the board is also the CEO in the year before the IPO, and zero
otherwise. Number of board directors is the number of board directors in the year before the IPO. Number of independent directors as percentage
of total is the ratio of the number of independent directors over the total number of board directors in the year before the IPO. Proceeds raised are
the amount of IPO proceeds as a percentage of the firm’s equity for the year before the IPO. Ln (total assets) is the arithmetic mean of total assets
of the three consecutive years before the IPO year (in natural log form). Ln (market value) is the arithmetic mean of market values after the IPO
(in natural log form) for three consecutive year-ends (last trading day of the year)
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where Governance variables include (1) if the CEO is
chairman, (2) board size, and (3) board independence; and
Control variables include (1) first-day return (firm), (2) IPO
first-day return (market), (3) proceeds raised, (4) Ln (total
assets), (5) industry dummies, and (6) firm/year dummies.
The results are reported in Table 4.
In Model 1, only corporate governance variables and
control variables are loaded as independent variables. Of
these governance variables, only board independence is
significantly associated with the change in ROA, but with a
negative sign, indicating that board independence has a
negative effect on post-IPO accounting performance. This
finding is consistent with that of Kroll et al. (2007) and
Walters et al. (2010). The indication is that for young firms,
a board where the majority of members are from the ori-
ginal top management team (rather than independent out-
siders) is beneficial to the long-run performance of firms. It
is interesting to note that the adjusted R2 of Model 1 is
18.4 %, and this increases to 34.1 % for Model 2, in which
social capital variables and control variables are loaded as
independent variables. Such a huge difference shows that
in China, social capital has a much greater effect than
formal governance mechanisms on post-IPO accounting
performance. Furthermore, when governance variables and
social capital variables are both loaded (Models 3–6),
board independence is no longer significant.
The dummy variable for political bridging social capital
is positively and significantly associated with the change in
ROA, which is consistent with H1 that political connec-
tions of the founder and his/her team improve the post-IPO
performance of listed entrepreneurial firms. In more spe-
cific terms, with all else being constant, if a sample firm
with no previous political connection successfully estab-
lishes political social capital, the change in that firm’s ROA
will increase by 2.5 percentage points (note that the sample
mean is -6.13 %). This finding indicates that in an
emerging, transitional economy like China, the political
dimension of bridging social capital is vitally important for
the growth of entrepreneurial firms.
The percentage of new shares issued (external investor
bridging social capital) is also significantly and positively
associated with the change in ROA, which supports H2 that
external investor bridging social capital is beneficial for the
post-IPO performance of listed entrepreneurial firms. In
more specific terms, a one-standard deviation increase in
the percentage of new shares issued to the public leads to a
2.1-percentage point increase in its change in ROA. This
result implies that the openness and willingness of internal
controlling shareholders to share power with external
shareholders creates bridging social capital, which favors
better post-IPO performance.
The significant and negative coefficient for related-party
transaction intensity (intragroup bonding social capital)
relates to H3. It indicates that the more related-party trans-
actions a firm conducts, the worse its post-IPO accounting
performance is. As discussed in the hypothesis development
section, one view of intragroup bonding social capital pre-
dicts that related-party transactions will help compensate for
the weakness of the external market and improve the post-
IPO performance of listed entrepreneurial firms; while
another view predicts the opposite, arguing that related-party
transactions cause unaccountability and low efficiency. Our
findings suggest that for our sample of listed Chinese
entrepreneurial firms, the negative effect of related-party
transactions outweighs the positive effect. In terms of eco-
nomic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in the
intensity of related-party transactions can reduce the change
in ROA by 1.3 percentage points.
Control variables include two variables related to the








year-3 year-2 year-1 year 1 year 2 year 3
change in performance
ROA ROE
Fig. 1 Change in performance over sample period. This figure
presents the sample mean of ROA (net income over total assets) and
ROE (net income over equity) for the three consecutive years before
the IPO and the three consecutive years after the IPO
Change in ROA ¼ b0 þ b1 Political bridging social capital
þ b2 External investor bridging social capital
þ b3 Intragroup bonding social capital þ b4 Governance variables
þ b5 Control variables þ e
ð1Þ
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the IPO issue price was determined by the regulator,
based on a fixed PE ratio, and the first-day return reflects
investors’ expectations of the firm’s future performance,
rather than a firm’s decision to ‘‘leave money on the
table.’’ Furthermore, to capture the investors’ impression
of the overall market performance, we use not only the
sample firm’s IPO first-day return, but also the average
IPO first-day return of all companies conducting an IPO
in the month a given sample firm went public. As dis-
cussed before, there may be a time lag before the IPO
proceeds are invested and the outputs of those invest-
ments translate into net income. We therefore control for
Table 3 Univariate test results




T test Wilcoxon rank-sum test
Mean p 50 Mean p 50
Panel A
Change in sales as percentage of pre-IPO sales 1.83 1.37 2.56 1.68 -1.71* -1.25
Change in asset turnover -0.39 -0.36 -0.22 -0.18 -2.10** -3.29***
Change in ROA -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -2.75*** -3.39***
Change in ROE -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 -2.07** -2.34**
Post-IPO three-year abnormal stock return -0.01 -0.14 0.49 -0.12 -1.33 -1.11
No. obs. 99 82






T test Wilcoxon rank-sum test
Mean p 50 Mean p 50
Panel B
Change in sales as percentage of pre-IPO sales 2.01 1.42 2.24 1.53 -0.57 -0.09
Change in asset turnover -0.39 -0.35 -0.27 -0.24 -1.46 -1.91*
Change in ROA -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -1.33 -0.90
Change in ROE -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16 0.14 0.36
Post-IPO three-year abnormal stock return 0.52 0.02 -0.05 -0.20 1.58 1.90*
No. obs. 85 96






T test Wilcoxon rank-sum test
Mean p 50 Mean p 50
Panel C
Change in sales as percentage of pre-IPO sales 2.53 1.55 1.73 1.37 1.95* 1.41
Change in asset turnover -0.28 -0.26 -0.36 -0.33 0.89 1.00
Change in ROA -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.51 0.43
Change in ROE -0.16 -0.15 -0.18 -0.16 0.84 0.72
Post-IPO three-year abnormal stock return 0.49 -0.12 -0.05 -0.17 1.50 0.79
No. Obs. 91 90
Means, median, t test statistics, and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of differences between firms with and without political bridging social capital,
between firms with low and high external investor bridging social capitals, and between firms with low and high intragroup bonding social
capitals in their post-IPO change in accounting performance and post-IPO three-year abnormal stock return. Change in sales as percentage of pre-
IPO sales is the difference between a sample firm’s three-year average sales after the IPO and the three-year average sales before the IPO as a
percentage of three-year average sales before the IPO. Change in asset turnover is the difference between a sample firm’s three-year average asset
turnover after the IPO and the three-year average asset turnover before the IPO. Asset turnover is the ratio of a firm’s sales revenues over total
assets. Change in ROA (ROE) is the difference between a sample firm’s three-year average ROA (ROE) after the IPO and the three-year average
ROA (ROE) before the IPO. ROA (ROE) is the ratio of net income over total assets (equity). Post-IPO three-year stock abnormal return is a
sample firm’s stock return during the period of 3 years starting from the next trading day after the IPO, net of the market return. Market return is
the arithmetic mean of return for all stocks outstanding on the market during the same period. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1 %
(***), 5 % (**), and 10 % (*) level, respectively
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that factor by adding the ratio of IPO proceeds over the
sample firms’ pre-IPO equity. Firm size is measured by
the natural log of total assets. Firm/year dummies (based
on IPO year) and industry dummies (based on 4-digit
CIGS industry classifications) are also added as control
variables. With all of the governance variables and
control variables added in Model 3, the direction and
significance of coefficients for the social capital variables
Table 4 OLS regression of the effect of social capital on post-IPO accounting performance (see Eq. 1)
Dep. variable Change in ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)










Post-IPO political bridging social
capital
0.019* (1.750) 0.015 (1.387)



































































IPO first-day return (firm) 0.013*
(1.781)
0.005 (0.824) 0.004 (0.636) 0.010 (1.596) 0.004 (0.623)
IPO first-day return (market) -0.000
(-0.706)
0.000 (0.147) 0.000 (0.256) -0.000
(-0.189)
0.000 (0.299)
Firm/year dummies Included, but not reported for brevity













Adjusted R2 0.184 0.341 0.348 0.337 0.299 0.341
F statistic 2.151 3.728 3.423 3.306 3.009 3.293
No. obs. 175 170 169 169 175 169
This table reports the OLS regression of the effect of social capital on change in ROA. Change in ROA is the difference between a sample firm’s
three-year average ROA after the IPO and the three-year average ROA before the IPO. ROA is the ratio of net income over total assets. Political
bridging social capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the entrepreneur or a management team member has political connections, which is
defined as having past working experience in government or SOEs, being a member of the National People’s Congress or National Political
Consultative Conference, or a Chairman of a National Industry Association. Pre-IPO Political bridging social capital is a dummy variable that
equals one if the firm has developed political connections before the IPO. Post-IPO political bridging social capital is a dummy variable that
equals one if the firm has no political connections before the IPO, and has developed political connections only after the IPO. External investor
bridging social capital is the percentage of new shares floated to the public in the IPO. Intragroup bonding social capital is the ratio of total
related-party transactions in the three post-IPO years over total sales in the three post-IPO years. Proceeds raised is the amount of IPO proceeds
as a percentage of the firm’s equity for the year before the IPO. Ln (total assets) is the arithmetic mean of total assets of the three consecutive
years before the IPO year (in natural log form). ‘‘If CEO is chairman‘‘ is a dummy variable that equals one if the chairman of the board is also the
CEO in the year before IPO, and zero otherwise. Board size is the natural log of number of board directors in the year before the IPO. Board
independence is the ratio of the number of independent directors over the total number of board directors in the year before the IPO. IPO first-day
return (firm) is the sample firm’s IPO first-day return, which is the difference between the IPO first-day closing price and IPO offering price
divided by offering price. IPO first-day return (market) is the average IPO first-day return of all companies conducting an IPO in the same month
our sample firm went public. Firm/year dummies and industry dummies are added but not reported. T statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks
denote statistical significance at the 1 % (***), 5 % (**), and 10 % (*) level, respectively
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remain stable. It is worth noting that the governance
variables, such as chairman/CEO duality or board inde-
pendence, are hardly significant once social capital
variables are loaded as independent variables.
In the unreported robustness check, we also test the
change in ROE performance. The results remain broadly
similar.
The Endogeneity Issue and Causality
As entrepreneurs do not randomly establish social capital,
this study involves an endogeneity issue that must be
addressed to achieve a better understanding of the rela-
tionship between social capital and post-IPO performance.
For political bridging social capital, the reverse causality
explanation would be that a firm with better performance is
better able to develop political connections. To address this
concern, we split political connections into those developed
before the IPO and those developed after the IPO. Post-IPO
political connections are more likely to be developed by
firms with superior post-IPO firm performance.
Of our sample firms, 58 have pre-IPO political con-
nections, and 32 have post-IPO political connections. It is
interesting to note that of the 58 firms with pre-IPO
political connections, only eight developed further political
connections in the post-IPO period, which indicates that
pre- and post-IPO political connections are substitutes, and
that the firms without pre-IPO political connections are
more eager to develop them after the IPO.
The sample firms’ pre-IPO and post-IPO political con-
nections are reported in Table 4, in Columns 4 and 5,
respectively. The coefficient remains significant, but the
significance declines slightly compared with Columns 2 or
3. This difference shows that as the firms with pre- and
post-IPO political connections seldom overlap, these two
dummies indicate a contrast not only between firms with
and without political connections, but also between firms
with pre- and post-IPO political connections, when both
have superior performances.11 These findings show that
endogeneity is not likely to be a serious issue here.
However, for reasons of prudence, the following analysis
focuses solely on pre-IPO political connections. Arguably,
there is still a possibility that firms with good prospects are
more likely to attract managers with political connections.
As we look only at the post-IPO performance change net of
pre-IPO performance, this endogeneity concern can be
largely mitigated. Also, the time lag between pre-IPO
political bridging social capital and post-IPO performance
makes the causation clearer.
Regarding the percentage of shares floated (our proxy
for external investor bridging social capital), an alternative
explanation is that the causal relationship runs from post-
IPO performance to shares floated, as the founders usually
have an information advantage and are better able to pre-
dict future performance. However, if that is the case, we
should see a negative association between the percentage
of shares floated and post-IPO performance, because if
insider information leads the founder to anticipate a drop in
performance, he will try to sell more shares to the public in
the IPO, and vice versa.
For the intragroup bonding social capital proxy (i.e.,
related-party transaction intensity), endogeneity is less
likely to be an issue, as there are contradictory theoretical
predictions regarding the effect of related-party transaction
intensity on post-IPO performance.
Post-IPO Market Performance and the Firm’s Social
Capital
After investigating the effect of social capital on the post-
IPO accounting performance of Chinese entrepreneurial
companies, we explore whether those factors have a
bearing on post-IPO market performance. The OLS
regression model is:
where Governance variables include: (1) if the CEO is
chairman, (2) board size, and (3) board independence; and
Control variables include: (1) IPO first-day return (firm),
(2) IPO first-day return (market), (3) proceeds raised, (4)
Ln (market value), (5) change in ROA, (6) industry dum-
mies, and (7) firm/year dummies.
In Table 5, the dependent variable is the post-IPO three-
year abnormal stock return, which is the sample firm’s
Post-IPO three-year abnormal stock return ¼ b0 þ b1 Political bridging social capital
þ b2 External investor bridging social capital
þ b3 Intragroup bonding social capital
þ b4 Governance variables þ b5 Control variables þ e
ð2Þ
11 When both the pre- and post-IPO connections are loaded in
Column 5, the significance bounces back.
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stock return during the period of 3 years starting from the
next trading day after the IPO, net of the market return
during the same period. If a firm undertakes an IPO on
April 1, 2005, then this period runs from April 2, 2005 (if it
is a trading day) to April 2, 2008 (or if that day is not a
trading day, the last trading day prior to April 2, 2008). The
Table 5 OLS regression of the effect of social capital on post-IPO market performance (see Eq. 2)
Dep. variable Post-IPO three-year stock abnormal return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Pre-IPO political bridging social
capital
0.683* (1.886) 0.630* (1.759)


















































If CEO is chairman 0.244 (0.719) 0.177 (0.491) 0.102 (0.278) 0.280 (0.832) 0.177 (0.488)






























Change in ROA 3.900 (1.372) 1.037 (0.321) 1.544 (0.479) 2.569 (0.860) 0.829 (0.259)
Firm/year dummies Included, but not reported for brevity













Adjusted R2 0.051 0.114 0.087 0.077 0.097 0.103
F statistic 1.269 1.692 1.423 1.369 1.494 1.493
No. obs. 175 173 169 169 175 169
This table reports the OLS regression of the effect of social capital on post-IPO three-year stock abnormal return. Post-IPO three-year stock
abnormal return is a sample firm’s stock return during the period of 3 years starting from the next trading day after the IPO, net of the market
return. Market return is the arithmetic mean of return for all stocks outstanding on the market during the same period. Political bridging social
capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the entrepreneur or a management team member has political connections, which is defined as
having past working experience in government or SOEs, being a member of the National People’s Congress or National Political Consultative
Conference, or a Chairman of a National Industry Association. Pre-IPO Political bridging social capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the
firm has developed political connections before the IPO. Post-IPO political bridging social capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm
has no political connections before the IPO, and has developed political connections only after the IPO. External investor bridging social capital
is the percentage of new shares floated to the public in the IPO. Intragroup bonding social capital is the ratio of total related-party transactions in
the three post-IPO years over total sales in the three post-IPO years. Proceeds raised is the amount of IPO proceeds as a percentage of the firm’s
equity for the year before the IPO. Ln (market value) is the arithmetic mean of market values after the IPO (in natural log form) for the three
consecutive year-ends (last trading day of the calendar year). ‘‘If CEO is chairman‘‘ is a dummy variable that equals one if the chairman of the
board is also the CEO in the year before the IPO, and zero otherwise. Board size is the natural log of the number of board directors in the year
before the IPO. Board independence is the ratio of the number of independent directors over the total number of board directors in the year before
the IPO. IPO first-day return (firm) is the sample firm’s IPO first-day return, which is the difference between the IPO first-day closing price and
the IPO offering price divided by the offering price. IPO first-day return (market) is the average IPO first-day return of all companies conducting
an IPO in the same month our sample firm went public. Firm/year dummies and industry dummies are added but not reported. T statistics are in
parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1 % (***), 5 % (**), and 10 % (*) level, respectively
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market return is calculated as the arithmetic mean of
returns for all stocks outstanding on the market during the
same period. If the alternative measure of weighted aver-
age market return is used, the results remain stable.
The independent variables are largely the same as in
Table 4, except that firm size is now proxied by the aver-
age year-end market value (in log form) during the three-
year period. We also control for accounting performance
by using the post-IPO change in ROA, because higher
abnormal stock returns may simply be due to better
accounting performance.
As in Table 4, Model 1 of Table 5 includes only gov-
ernance and control variables as the independent variables.
However, none of the governance variables are signifi-
cantly associated with post-IPO market performance.
Furthermore, the adjusted R2 increases from 5.1 % for
Model 1 to 11.4 % for Model 2, in which governance
variables are replaced with social capital variables. Once
again, the difference suggests that social capital has a
greater effect than formal governance mechanisms not only
on post-IPO accounting performance, but also on post-IPO
market performance. In Table 5, the direction and signifi-
cance of the coefficients for pre-IPO political social
bridging capital and for intragroup bonding social capital
show that these two factors have the same effect on market
performance as on accounting performance. More pre-
cisely, political social capital has a positive and significant
effect on post-IPO market performance, which is consistent
with H1. Moreover, intragroup bonding social capital sig-
nificantly and negatively affects post-IPO market











Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS
If CEO is
chairman
0.45 (-0.88) 1.398** (2.289) -0.739 (-0.944) -0.018* (-1.973) 0.027 (0.205)
Board size -0.443 (-0.459) -0.388 (-0.358) -0.582 (-0.363) 0.042** (2.456) -0.107 (-0.419)
Board
independence
1.95 (0.698) 1.839 (0.632) -1.682 (-0.435) -0.034 (-0.660) 0.382 (0.503)
Ln (total
assets)
-0.271 (-0.785) -0.434 (-1.052) -0.353 (-0.732) -0.039*** (-6.169) 0.113 (1.200)
Average pre-
IPO ROA
-7.708 (-1.539) -6.184 (-1.094) -9.502 (-1.169) -0.512*** (-6.003) -1.678 (-1.326)
Firm/year
dummies
Included, but not reported for brevity
Industry
dummies
Included, but not reported for brevity
Constant 25.053*** (3.508) 27.872 10.801 (1.032) 0.872*** (6.479) -0.831 (-0.416)
Pseudo R2 0.1429 0.0066 0.1814
LR v2 29.22 44.52 21.59
Adjusted R2 0.531 0.465
F statistic 7.146 5.730
No. obs. 148 148 98 175 175
This table reports the logit and OLS regressions of the effect of firms’ governance and financial characteristics on the probability of establishing
social capital. Political bridging social capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the entrepreneur or a management team member has
political connections, which are defined as having past working experience in government or SOEs, being a member of the National People’s
Congress or National Political Consultative Conference, or a Chairman of a National Industry Association. Pre-IPO Political bridging social
capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has developed political connections before the IPO. Post-IPO political bridging social
capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has no political connections before the IPO, and has developed political connections only
after the IPO. External investor bridging social capital is the percentage of new shares floated to the public in the IPO. Intragroup bonding social
capital is the ratio of total related-party transactions in the three post-IPO years over total sales in the three post-IPO years. Proceeds raised is the
amount of IPO proceeds as a percentage of the firm’s equity for the year before the IPO. Ln (total assets) is the arithmetic mean of total assets of
the three consecutive years before the IPO year (in natural log form). ‘‘If CEO is chairman‘‘ is a dummy variable that equals one if the chairman
of the board is also the CEO in the year before the IPO, and zero otherwise. Board size is the natural log of number of board directors in the year
before IPO. Board independence is the ratio of number of independent directors over total number of board directors in the year before the IPO.
IPO first-day return (firm) is the sample firm’s IPO first-day return, which is the difference between the IPO first-day closing price and the IPO
offering price divided by the offering price. IPO first-day return (market) is the average IPO first-day return of all companies conducting an IPO
in the same month our sample firm went public. Firm/year dummies and industry dummies are added but not reported. T statistics are in
parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1 % (***), 5 % (**), and 10 % (*) level, respectively
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performance, supporting H3. The economic significance of
these two variables is also far from negligible. If a sample
firm succeeds in establishing political social capital, it will
increase its 3-year post-IPO abnormal return by 70 per-
centage points (note that the sample mean is 22 %); while a
one-standard deviation increase in intragroup bonding
social capital will result in a reduction of post-IPO
abnormal returns by 43 percentage points. However, H2 on
the effect of external investor bridging social capital is not
supported. As discussed before, the above regressions are
conducted on winsorized abnormal stock returns to elimi-
nate the influence of outliers. In an unreported robustness
check, the results based on unwinsorized abnormal stock
return are largely similar.
Determinants of Establishment of Social Capital
by Entrepreneurial Firms
What types of entrepreneurial firms are most likely to
establish social capital? Table 6 reports regression results
that relate to the probability of establishing social capital.
The logit model tested (Columns 1–3) is as follows:
The OLS model tested (Columns 4–5) is as
follows:
These tests show that no variables are associated with
the likelihood of a firm establishing social capital. How-
ever, they do indicate that the chairman/CEO is more likely
to build pre-IPO political connections, but less likely to
share power with external investors by issuing additional
portions of shares. Also, firms with poor pre-IPO
performance and small firms are more likely to issue
greater portions of new shares.
Overall, the results shown in Table 6 suggest that con-
cerns for firm performance, quality or corporate gover-
nance might not be the main motives for establishing social
capital. This suggests that our previous findings are less
likely to be affected by endogeneity issues, as high-quality
firms tend to have social capital in place before going
public.
Discussion of the Results, and Implications
for Business Ethics
The empirical results obtained in the above statistical
analysis validate most of the hypotheses we developed
based on social capital theory. The results for political
bridging social capital and intragroup bonding social cap-
ital are consistent and significant, statistically and eco-
nomically, for both post-IPO accounting and post-IPO
market performance. The positive effect of external
investor bridging social capital is significant for accounting
performance, but not for market performance. It is impor-
tant to note that all of these results are obtained after
controlling for major firm-level formal governance features
and financial characteristics that have been proved in pre-
vious studies to influence firm performance.
First, we find that political social capital is positively
associated with post-IPO accounting and market perfor-
mance. This empirical result validates the existing argu-
ment in the business ethics literature. For example, Zhang
ðPre/post-IPO) Political bridging social capital ¼ b0 þ b1 If CEO is chairman
þ b2 Board size þ b3 Board independence
þ b4 Ln total assetsð Þ þ b5 Average Pre-IPO ROA
þ b6 Industry dummies þ b7 Firm/year dummies þ e
ð3Þ
External investor bridging social capital/Intragroup bonding social capital ¼ b0 þ b1 If CEO is chairman þ b2 Board size
þ b3 Board independence þ b4 Ln total assetsð Þ
þ b5 Average Pre-IPO ROA þ b6 Industry dummies
þ b7 Firm/year dummies þ e
ð4Þ
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and Zhang (2006) note that ‘‘it is the interpersonal net-
works with the governmental officials—and not any kind of
interpersonal networks with other individuals—which have
a more far-reaching influence on firms’ performances’’ (p.
389). Our result, meanwhile, contrasts sharply with the
studies by Fan et al. (2007) and Hung et al. (2012) on a
Chinese SOE sample, which both find that in the case of
SOEs, politically connected firms’ post-listing performance
is worse than the performance of non-connected firms. In
China, like other transitional and emerging economies,
political bridging social capital plays an important role in
the growth of entrepreneurial firms, given that the state still
controls the lion’s share of economic resources (Story
2012). Moreover, as Tian, Gao and Cone (2008) confirm,
‘‘ideology is also an important reason that drives private
enterprises to participate in politics’’ (p. 631). In Chinese
society, which is still officially dominated by traditional
Marxist ideology, entrepreneurs often feel insecure about
their legitimacy in society (Li and Zhang 2007). By
obtaining political connections, entrepreneurs can legally
promote their ideology (Tian et al. 2008). They may also be
able to prevent expropriation of their assets and reduce
rent-seeking by different regulatory authorities (dela Rama
2012). Tian et al. (2008) explain ‘‘the reasons why private
entrepreneurs wish to engage in political activities are
similar to those of previously marginalized groups in the
West’’ (p. 631). It is interesting to note the finding of Fan
et al. (2007) that for partially privatized SOEs, a politically
connected CEO is associated with inferior post-IPO
accounting and stock performance. These authors argue
that when an SOE has a politically connected CEO, it is
easier for politicians to extract resources from the enter-
prise for the sake of objectives inconsistent with value
maximization. The contrast between previous findings
concerning SOEs and the results of this study indicates that
for privately owned entrepreneurial firms, unlike their
state-owned counterparts, the positive effect of political
social capital outweighs the negative effect of government
intervention.
A second finding is that the percentage of shares issued
is significantly and positively associated with changes in
post-IPO accounting performance, although this link is not
validated for post-IPO market performance. As explained
previously, in China the type II agency problem is pre-
dominant, as opposed to the prevalence of type I agency
problems in the US. Therefore, internal controlling share-
holders can create greater bridging social capital with
external investors by issuing more shares. External inves-
tors tend to play their monitoring and consulting roles more
actively, and help listed entrepreneurial firms to improve
their corporate governance quality. As a result, the firm
tends to perform better in accounting terms. This result also
aligns with certain interpretations of stakeholder theory. As
Wijnberg (2000) explains, ‘‘the corporation should be
considered as existing to allow the decision maker … to
make decisions that involve the interests of different
stakeholders’’ (p. 329). Expanding this stakeholder theory
further, Russo and Perrini (2010) argue that ‘‘this is not
only to say that corporations have to act in a responsible
way to avoid growing stakeholder pressures, but to achieve
a better or ‘good’ society’’ (p. 209).
A third finding is that the intensity of related-party
transactions after the IPO is significantly and negatively
associated with the post-IPO accounting and market per-
formance. As related-party transactions capture the intra-
group bonding social capital, this evidence suggests that
intragroup bonding social capital may add value to the
whole business group controlled by the entrepreneur
through the ‘‘internal market.’’ However, the negative
effects of these transactions (i.e., the lack of independence
or accountability and the likelihood of expropriation) still
outweigh their positive effects on the performance of the
listed entity. As dela Rama 2012 explains, ‘‘the strength of
business-affiliated business group transactions can also be
the source of its weakness. In an era that emphasizes
transparency, the related-party transactions of business
groups must ensure it can withstand such scrutiny. Finan-
cial markets ultimately punish business groups that have
less than transparent business arrangements’’ (p. 526). Our
result empirically validates this argument.
A fourth finding is that among the control variables,
those proxying formal governance mechanisms such as
chairman/CEO duality, board size, and board independence
show hardly any effect on firm performance. As we pointed
out at the beginning of this study, in emerging and tran-
sitional economies such as China, the lack of efficient
‘‘formal institutions’’ (North 1990) tends to make social
capital (which is a form of informal institution) even more
crucial for entrepreneurs operating in those economies.
In many emerging markets, including China, the hostile
environments in which business operates are characterized
by the presence of corrupt sub-systems, which are ‘‘rela-
tively stable networks rather than exceptional, independent,
individual events’’ (Nielsen 2003, p. 125). Dyer and Mor-
tensen (2005) explain that ‘‘hostile environments create a
situation where individual entrepreneurs face significant
moral dilemmas. They can either comply with the law, thus
forfeiting the success of their businesses and their own
economic well-being, or they can attempt to work within
the context of a corrupt system in order to survive. Most
choose survival’’ (p. 253). However, ‘‘buying into’’ this
Darwinian discourse presents some major business ethics
problems (Sanders 2010). Most of the political connections
observed can be classified as ‘‘utilitarian relationships.’’
Zhang and Zhang (2006) describe such relationships as
follows: ‘‘Because developing, cultivating and maintaining
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Guanxi is a time- and money-consuming endeavor, both of
the exchange partners usually have a conscious and elab-
orate cost–rent consideration, which in turn sharply influ-
ences their decision-making procedure … In its most
extreme form, the utilitarian type is inevitably closely
associated with corruption and bribery’’ (p. 383). There are
two major risks behind the proliferation of this type of
relationship. The first risk is that it may provoke a huge
misallocation of resources in society. In fact, as noted by
Krueger (1974), people invest heavily in rent-seeking
behavior to influence wealth redistribution rather than
wealth production. Also, the progressive increase in the
power of corporate political action may allow politically
connected firms to deeply entrench their interests, and so
create a group with dangerous mixed interests in politics
and business. The ultimate risk is that eventually the whole
Chinese economy could ‘‘[fall] into the mud pit of crony
capitalism’’ (Wu 2004).
Conclusion
This study proposes to consider social capital as a reflec-
tion of informal governance mechanisms, and examines its
role in the post-IPO accounting and stock performance of
entrepreneurial firms. The uniqueness of China’s regula-
tory and institutional background allows us to examine the
informal governance role played by the entrepreneur’s
social capital in the capital market.
Unlike most existing studies in this field that draw
exclusively on agency theory, this study takes a new angle
to analyze entrepreneurial firm performance in the context
of an emerging and transitional economy. We develop and
test several proxies for social capital in the context of
China’s capital market. The distinguishing feature of
emerging economies is their low institutional efficiency
and the prevalence of relational contracts. Social capital,
therefore, exerts a huge influence on a firm’s performance,
and formal governance mechanisms such as board size or
board independence have virtually no explanatory power
for IPO performance.
We find that political bridging social capital (the most
important type of social capital) helps in improving com-
panies’ post-IPO performance, and the bridging social
capital developed from interaction between controlling
internal shareholders and small external shareholders is
also beneficial for post-IPO performance. However,
bonding social capital, derived from the connections
between the business group and the listed entity, tends to
reduce a firm’s post-IPO performance.
In addition to its academic contribution, this study also
yields strong practical implications. The first implication is
that for entrepreneurs in an emerging and transitional
economy, acquiring adequate political bridging social
capital needs to be understood as part of the business
strategy. Furthermore, the benefits and costs of intragroup
bonding capital should be carefully balanced. Although
related-party transactions may benefit the listed entity and
the whole group in some circumstances, the ‘‘dark side’’ of
these transactions should not be ignored, especially as
regards the interests of external shareholders who invest
only in the listed entity.
For investors, our findings provide some insights that
should be helpful in selecting promising and trustworthy
entrepreneurial firms. In terms of promoting ‘‘investor
activism,’’ our findings can also serve as a roadmap for
external investors if they intend to scrutinize firms’ man-
agement more closely.
For regulators and policymakers in emerging and/or
transitional economies, the first implication of our findings
is that development of the market economy and construc-
tion of formal institutions should be the highest priorities.
Although political social capital can bring benefits for
entrepreneurial companies, such political connections nat-
urally involve side effects. As dela Rama (2012) explains,
‘‘a sustainable and strong private sector requires a strong
public sector so that the latter has the capacity to regulate
and the resources to apply laws. A regulator that is not
politicized and that can make robust independent decisions
will give more confidence to the majority of private sector
participants’’ (p. 517). In the long run, such ‘‘relational
transactions’’ between firms and political leaders need to
gradually recede, and be replaced by ‘‘arm’s-length trans-
actions.’’ One regulatory implication is that regulators can
play an effective role in protecting small external investors
and monitoring the behavior of internal controlling
shareholders.
Despite the above contributions to both theory and
practice, this study is subject to some limitations, which
also indicate certain directions for future research. First, the
study is focused on only one country and its specific market
environment. However, as China is the largest and fastest-
growing emerging transitional economy in the world, our
implications can be generalized to other economies. A
cross-country comparison between various emerging and
transitional economies is therefore one possible direction
for future study.
Second, there is some question over the validity of
measurement for our variables, and our measures probably
capture only a few aspects of social capital. Given the
breadth and complexity of social capital phenomena, future
research could use the theoretical framework constructed in
this study to develop appropriate social capital measures
for each country’s unique institutional environment.
Third, this study examines the associations between
social capital and entrepreneurial firm performance, and
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the choices involved in building social capital can be
endogenous. This endogeneity issue is only partially
addressed here, by distinguishing between pre- and post-
IPO political connections. One possible direction for future
research would be to use experimental settings, for
instance, involving policy regime changes or sudden deaths
of entrepreneurs.
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Appendix: Definition of Variables and Sources of Data
Variables Definition Data sources
Change in ROA The difference between a sample firm’s three-year average
ROA after the IPO and the three-year average ROA before
the IPO. ROA is the ratio of net income over total assets
Pre-IPO data are hand-collected from the firm’s
prospectus, and post-IPO data are collected from the
Wind database
Change in ROE The difference between a sample firm’s three-year average
ROE after the IPO and the three-year average ROE before
the IPO. ROE is the ratio of net income over equity
Pre-IPO data are hand-collected from the firm’s





A sample firm’s stock return during the period of 3 years
starting from the next trading day after the IPO, net of the
market return. Market return is the arithmetic mean of return
for all stocks outstanding on the market during the same
period
Individual stock return and market return are both
collected from the CSMAR database
Change in sales as
percentage of pre-
IPO sales
The difference between a sample firm’s three-year average
sales after the IPO and the three-year average sales before
the IPO as a percentage of three-year average sales before
the IPO
Pre-IPO data are hand-collected from the firm’s




The difference between a sample firm’s three-year average
asset turnover after the IPO and the three-year average asset
turnover before the IPO. Asset turnover is the ratio of a
firm’s sales revenue over total assets
Pre-IPO data are hand-collected from the firm’s




Dummy variable that equals one if the entrepreneur or a
management team member has political connections, which
is defined as having past working experience in government
or SOEs, being a member of the National People’s Congress
or National Political Consultative Conference, or a Chairman
of a National Industry Association
Pre-IPO data are hand-collected from the firm’s
prospectus, and post-IPO data are hand-collected from




Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has developed
political connections before the IPO. Having political
connections is defined as having an entrepreneur or
management team member who has past working experience
in government or SOEs, is a member of the National
People’s Congress or National Political Consultative
Conference, or a Chairman of a National Industry
Association





Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has no political
connections before the IPO, and has developed political
connections only after the IPO. Having political connections
is defined as having an entrepreneur or management team
member who has past working experience in government or
SOEs, is a member of the National People’s Congress or
National Political Consultative Conference, or a Chairman of
a National Industry Association




Percentage of new shares floated to the public in the IPO Hand-collected from the firm’s prospectus
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